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Abstract
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of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
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In many emerging democracies women are less likely to 
vote than men and, when they do vote, are more likely to 
follow the wishes of household males. The authors assess 
the impact of a voter awareness campaign on female 
turnout and candidate choice. Geographic clusters within 
villages were randomly assigned to treatment or control, 
and within treated clusters, some households were left 
untreated. Compared with women in control clusters, 
both treated and untreated women in treated clusters are 
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may be contacted at xgine@worldbank.org and gmansuri@worldbank.org. 
12 percentage points more likely to vote, and are also 
more likely to exercise independence in candidate choice, 
indicating large spillovers. Data from polling stations 
suggest that treating 10 women increased turnout by 
about 9 votes, resulting in a cost per vote of US$ 2.3. 
Finally, a 10 percent increase in the share of treated 
women at the polling station led to a 6 percent decrease 
in the share of votes of the winning party. 
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1. Introduction 
A basic premise of representative democracy is that those who are subject to policy should have 
a voice in its making. Although women account for half of the world‘s population, they have 
historically lagged behind men in legal and political rights. In recognition of this, suffrage was 
extended to women in most western democracies in the early 20
th
 century and the new 
democracies that emerged after WWII followed suit and granted women de jure rights to 
political participation in all democratic institutions.
1
   
Despite these improvements, women are still far less likely than men to stand for public office, 
even in developed countries with older democracies.  They are also less likely to participate in 
the electoral process as voters or to exercise independence in candidate choice when they do 
vote. Instead, women report voting in accordance with the preferences of the caste, clan or 
household head in contrast to men of all ages (CLRAE, 2002).
2
 
While women‘s relative absence from elected public office has received considerable policy 
attention in recent years
3
, there have been few attempts to reduce barriers to women‘s 
participation as voters, and even less attention has been paid to the use of women as passive vote 
banks, when they do participate.  If preferences over the allocation of public resources vary by 
gender, this neglect could have implications for public policy, in addition to equity related 
concerns.
4
  
                                                          
1
  These rights were also brought into international law by several important agreements to which most countries are 
signatories. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Convention on the Political Rights 
of Women (1952); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979).  
2
 See also Zia and Bari (1999) and Bari (2005) for Pakistan. 
3 
A number of countries have passed legislation requiring fixed quotas for women.  In South Asia, for example, 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have all instituted quotas for women in both local and national assemblies.  
4
 Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) exploit the quota introduced for women in the Indian Gram Panchayats and find 
that elected women leaders are more likely to provide public goods preferred by women. Lott and Kenny (1999) find 
that women‘s suffrage in the US increased overall government revenues and expenditures and has led to more liberal 
voting patterns. Edlund and Pande (2002) find that the decline in marriage has contributed to the shift by women 
voters in the US towards the Democratic Party. Several studies of intra-household resource allocation (e.g. Thomas 
(1990), Lundberg and Pollack (1997) and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995)) have also shown that women tend to make 
different choices over the allocation of household budgets, such as higher investments in health and the education of 
children. Croson and Gneezy (2009) review the experimental literature on gender differences in preferences related 
to risk, social attitudes and competition.  
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Women in emerging democracies may face two distinct barriers to exercising their right to vote 
for a candidate of their choice. First, costs of participation may be too high. Traditions or cultural 
stereotypes may discourage the exercise of own preferences, mobility constraints may limit 
participation and, if there are expectations of voter intimidation or violence, personal security 
concerns may also loom larger among females. Second, women may have fewer or poorer 
sources of information about the significance of political participation or the balloting process, 
perhaps due in part to illiteracy and limited mobility. Lack of information may also reinforce 
stereotypes that further disengage women from public life. 
However, while attitudes and social mores change slowly, information provision can occur 
relatively quickly.
5
 If lack of awareness limits participation, as studies suggest, then access to 
information could enhance both equity and allocative efficiency as women select candidates that 
best reflect their preferences. At the same time, the mere act of participation may also serve to 
weaken pejorative perceptions about female efficacy that limit women‘s engagement in public 
life (Beaman et al., 2007).  
We test these ideas by conducting a field experiment to assess the impact of information on 
female turnout and independence of candidate choice. The setting for the experiment is rural 
Pakistan where women still face significant barriers to effective political participation, despite 
legislative reforms aimed at enhancing female participation in public life (Zia and Bari, 1999).
6
 
The awareness campaign was conducted just before the 2008 national elections. Study villages 
were divided into geographical clusters which were randomly assigned to treatment or control. 
Within treated clusters, only a subset of sample households was randomly assigned to receive a 
door-to-door awareness campaign. This allows us to assess the magnitude of spillovers within 
treated clusters without confronting the usual set of identification problems (Manski, 1993; 
1995).  
                                                          
5
 A number of recent studies have looked at the role of geography, shifts in technology and the development of 
institutions in the formation of cultural attitudes and beliefs about gender roles. See for e.g. Alesina et al (2010), 
Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Fernandez (2007), Fernandez and Fogli (2009) and Fortin (2005). 
6
 Zia and Bari report that women's registration as voters is often considered neither necessary nor appropriate by 
either household males or political parties. They also note that, in addition to cultural restrictions on mobility and 
low levels of literacy, women's lack of knowledge about the electoral system and about voting procedures 
constitutes an important barrier to the registration of women and female turnout in elections (pg. 89). 
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The campaign was developed as a set of simple visual aids with two different messages: the 
importance of voting which focused on the relationship between the electoral process and policy, 
and the significance of secret balloting which explained the actual balloting process. Treated 
women received either the first message or the first and the second, allowing us to test whether 
the knowledge that ballots are cast in an environment of secrecy enhances female participation, 
as well as independence in candidate choice.  
We find that turnout increases by about 12 percent for women in treated households compared to 
women in control clusters, with somewhat larger and more precise effects for women exposed to 
both messages. More importantly, we find comparable turnout rates for treated women and their 
untreated close neighbors, indicating large geographical spillovers. We then assess whether 
spillovers among close friends are larger than those among neighbors. The results are 
qualitatively similar. This is not too surprising given that close friends typically reside nearby. In 
addition, we use the GPS location of households to estimate spillovers beyond the (arbitrary) 
boundaries of the treatment clusters and find even larger effects.  
We also use administrative data from all polling stations that served the study villages and find 
that for every 10 treated women, (roughly 4 households), female turnout increases by about 9 
additional votes. Once we take this externality into account, the cost of the intervention drops 
from US $16.7 to about US $2.2 per additional vote. In contrast, using the same administrative 
data we find no effect on male turnout, suggesting either that the provision of information on 
electoral participation and processes is less salient for men or that there is little communication 
about political matters between men and women. Of course, it is also possible that men are 
simply not influenced by information provided by women.  
We then study whether the campaign influenced candidate and party choice. We find that it did. 
Treated women are significantly more likely to vote for the second most voted for political party. 
Control women in treated clusters behaved again as if directly treated, confirming once more the 
importance of social interactions. Polling station data show as well that an increase of 10 percent 
in the share of treated women led to decrease in the share of female votes for the winning party 
of 6 percent. These results suggest that the campaign could have influenced the share of votes at 
the constituency level, had it been implemented at a larger scale.  
5 
 
Given this result, we next check whether treatment decreases the male head‘s knowledge of the 
candidate choice of women in his household. Using follow-up survey data which asked the male 
head and each woman in the household about whether other women in the household had cast a 
vote and for whom they had voted, we construct cross-reports regarding candidate choice. Using 
these cross-reports, we find that male heads in treated households are indeed significantly less 
informed about the candidate choice of women in their households.  
Interestingly, we also find evidence of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Mullainathan and Washington, 
2009). Women in control clusters, among whom turnout was lower, were less likely to believe 
that the election was free and fair and more likely to report witnessing or hearing instances of 
violence in the village, compared to reports by women in treated clusters. 
While there is an extensive literature on the impact of Get-out the Vote or GOTV campaigns in 
developed countries, and in the US in particular (see Gerber and Green, 2000a and 2000b), much 
less is known about the impact of such campaigns in developing countries where voters tend to 
have poorer access to information and institutionalized party structures are also much less 
developed (Aker et al. 2010, Banerjee et al. 2010 and Pande 2011 for a review).
7,8
 
This paper contributes, therefore to two literatures. First, it adds to this nascent literature on pre-
election voter information campaigns in developing countries. Second, it is the only paper which, 
to our knowledge, assesses the impact of information externalities on voter turnout and candidate 
choice. This is critical for correctly measuring the cost-effectiveness of an information campaign, 
but it is also important for assessing the types of information that can be successfully transmitted 
through social networks.
,
 In this regard, our paper is closest to Duflo and Saez (2003) and 
contributes also to the burgeoning literature on social networks and peer effects (e.g. Sacerdote, 
2000 and Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007).   
                                                          
7
 In an experiment in the US where voters received postcards with information about their voting record, Gerber et 
al. (2008) find that turnout increased by about 8 percent in households that were shown their voting records as well 
as that of their neighbors. This increase in turnout is comparable to the impact of direct canvassing. Perhaps more 
related to our study, Nickerson (2008) conducted a door-to-door canvassing experiment to assess information 
spillovers within the household. He targets households with two registered voters and finds that the member that did 
not answer the door is nearly 60% as likely to vote as the treated member.  
8
 In developing countries there is a small experimental literature that has focused on electoral violence, clientelism 
and vote buying in the context of developing countries. Collier and Vicente (2007), for example, study the effect of 
an information campaign against electoral violence in Nigeria. Wantchekon (2003) has examined the effectiveness 
of clientelist messages in Benin and Vicente (2007) analyzes an information campaign against vote buying in Sao 
Tome and Principe, Vicente and Wantchekon (2009) provides a review. 
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While peer pressure may have contributed to the increase in turnout we observe (Funk, 2010), 
we provide evidence suggesting that the information content of the campaign mattered.  First, 
control women in treated clusters are far more likely than women in control clusters to discuss 
political issues with their neighbors, including political party and candidate positions and the 
importance of voting in accordance with one‘s own preferences. Second, male heads of control 
households in clusters treated with the message about the secrecy of the balloting process are less 
informed about the candidates chosen by women in their household, compared to control 
households in clusters treated with the message about the importance of voting only. This is 
evidence that even the more nuanced message about the secrecy of voting was conveyed to 
control women in treated clusters.
9
 
10
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context of the 2008 
election, the design of our experiment and the data. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy 
and results. In particular, Section 3.1 discusses the impact of the information campaign on 
turnout and assesses the size and significance of information spillovers, Section 3.2 discusses the 
evidence on independence of candidate choice, Section 3.3 examines the interaction between 
electoral competition and information provision and Section 3.4 assesses the impact of the 
campaign on knowledge and perceptions. Section 4 provides a cost-benefit analysis of the 
intervention and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Context and Experiment Design 
The experiment was carried out in collaboration with the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund 
(PPAF), the Marvi Rural Development Organization (MRDO), Research Consultants (RCons), 
ECI and the World Bank. PPAF is an apex institution created in 2000 with World Bank funding. 
PPAF provides capacity building and funding for community based development and 
                                                          
9
 In this sense the awareness campaign studied here is quite different from most GOTV campaigns, whose objective 
is to increase turnout by persuading subjects to vote. The awareness campaign, in contrast, is designed to inform 
women about their rights in the electoral process and how to exercise them.  
10
 One could also argue that the increase in turnout was due to the mere salience of the campaign (e.g. Zwane et al. 
forthcoming). However, at the time of the visit, households were already subject to multiple stimuli to vote. Indeed, 
over 75 percent of them reported receiving a visit prior to the election from party volunteers asking for their vote.  In 
addition, one could argue that the mere visit could have motivated treated women to vote (if they felt special for 
having been chosen and voted out of reciprocity). This is unlikely because untreated women in treated clusters (not 
chosen to receive the visit) show comparable turnout rates to directly treated women.  
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microfinance to its partner organizations, which are mostly NGOs. MRDO is one such non-
partisan NGO funded primarily by PPAF, that mobilizes women using a community based 
approach. RCons, a survey firm, helped MRDO implement the awareness campaign and 
collected the baseline and follow-up data. ECI, a non-partisan local training firm, collaborated in 
the design of the campaign. ECI had prior experience with the development of visual aids and 
pamphlets related to electoral participation and the balloting process. It was also actively 
engaged in the training of local election officers nationwide prior to the elections.  
2.1 Context  
The campaign was carried out in the districts of Sukkur and Khairpur in the southern province of 
Sindh. The districts were selected because of sharp electoral competition between the two main 
political parties, the Pakistan People‘s Party Parliamentarians (PPPP), which has a secular-left 
leaning platform and the Pakistan Muslim League Functional (PMLF), which was allied with the 
military regime.  
The initial sample included 12 villages, 6 villages from each district, and 24 polling stations from 
two constituencies.
11
 All candidates from both parties in these two constituencies were male. 
Villages were chosen to ensure variation in expected political competition at the polling station 
level, but given the context of the 2008 elections, 3 villages (3 polling stations) had to be 
dropped because the safety of the canvassing teams could not be guaranteed. The polling stations 
in these 3 villages were relatively more contested than those in our final sample of 9 villages and 
21 polling stations.  
Indeed, the 2008 national elections were held in an environment that was politically charged. 
After seven years of military rule, culminating in widespread opposition, the government 
declared emergency rule. The sitting judges of the Supreme Court were dismissed and there were 
fears that the incumbent government would engage in massive rigging. Scheduled initially for 
January 8
th
, 2008, the elections were postponed to February 18
th
, 2008 because Benazir Bhutto, 
                                                          
11
 Twelve polling stations were from the National Assembly constituency NA-199 (Sukkur) and the remaining 12 
from NA-215 (Khairpur). NA-199 had a total of 242 polling stations while NA-215 had 270 polling stations. The 
same 12 polling stations belonged to Provincial Assembly constituencies PS-4 (Sukkur) and PS-32 (Khairpur), 
respectively. PS-4 had 125 polling stations in total and PS-32 had 114 (see http://www.ecp.gov.pk/ for more 
information). 
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the leader of the PPPP, and a twice elected Prime Minister, was assassinated on December 27
th
, 
2007.  
In Sindh, traditionally a PPPP stronghold, a large turnout and a PPPP landslide was being 
anticipated due to a possible sympathy vote for Bhutto. At the same time, the expected PPPP 
landslide could have served to discourage supporters of PML-F, depressing turnout. Finally, 
there were concerns about electoral rigging and voter intimidation by the incumbent military 
government, though these decreased after Bhutto‘s assassination and the increased visibility of 
the elections. The net effect of these tendencies on turnout and party choice, particularly for 
women, was uncertain. 
The campaign was delivered door-to-door by a team of two women and was only attended by the 
women in each household. No men were allowed to be present during the sessions.
12
 It was 
designed as a set of simple visual aids accompanied by a well rehearsed and limited script. The 
campaign included two nonpartisan messages: the first focused on the importance of voting, the 
relationship between the electoral process and policy, including village development outcomes, 
while the second focused on the actual balloting process (the structure of a typical voting station 
and booth, the fact that male and female booths are separate, the secrecy of the ballot and the 
basic appearance of the ballot paper). The information campaign never mentioned a political 
party or candidate by name. As mentioned, this also distinguishes our awareness campaign from 
a GOTV campaign.
13
 Appendix A contains the translation of the script and Appendix B the 
translated visual aids. 
                                                          
12
 In many cases, men were not at home at the time of the visit, which took place during the morning and early 
afternoon. If men were home, they were requested to allow the female team members to meet with the women alone. 
In most cases this did not pose a problem since men are not usually present in an all women‘s gathering. In the few 
cases where men were reluctant to leave, the male supervisor discussed the information campaign in general terms 
with them and obtained agreement.   
13
 A GOTV campaign can be partisan or not, though a number of experimental studies have shown that partisan 
messages are less successful in motivating turnout. Cardy (2005), for example, finds that neither partisan direct mail 
nor partisan phone calls - used independently or together - managed to garner a significant voter response. In a 
similar vein, Gerber and Green (2000b) find that non-partisan messages are particularly effective in mobilizing 
unaffiliated past voters. The authors hypothesize that partisan voters may already receive adequate encouragement 
from their respective political parties while unaffiliated voters do not.  Moreover, they speculate that politically 
unattached voters may also have been impressed by the non-partisan appeal to civic responsibility. Horiuchi et al. 
(2007) also find that voters are less likely to abstain when they receive policy information about both ruling and 
opposition parties through their official party websites. The information effects are larger among those voters who 
were planning to vote, but were undecided about which party to vote for.    
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The campaign was implemented door-to-door for two main reasons. First, it provided a high 
degree of control over which households received the campaign and which did not, which is 
critical to measuring information spillovers and the cost-effectiveness of the campaign. Second, 
door-to-door information campaigns in the US have proven more cost-effective than other 
strategies like phone calls and direct mailings.
14
 In our context, door-to-door visits were also the 
most feasible choice given the low levels of literacy and cell-phone ownership among women, 
combined with low female mobility.
15
  
Table 1 Panel C indicates that female literacy rates are indeed very low in our study area, as they 
are all over rural Sindh. Less than 20 percent of adult women have any formal schooling. 
Women also have rather limited mobility even within their own villages. Most women in our 
sample can travel within the village on their own or accompanied by other females but not 
outside the village, where the presence of a male is required.  
Appendix Table A2 presents gender differences in access to media, knowledge of current events 
and participation in public life. The sample is confined to comparisons between the male head 
and his spouse. Women are far less likely to listen to local, national or international news 
channels (10 percent of women report listening to BBC compared to 48 percent of men, for 
example) and are far less informed about any political issue, including major events like the 
imposition of emergency rule in the country, which only 6 percent of women knew about, as 
compared to 82 percent of men. Women are also less likely to be able to correctly identify 
political party signs and names. Interestingly, this difference is not due to differential access to 
TV or radio. Instead it appears that men and women use media very differently.
16
 Women are 
also less engaged with any aspect of village public life. They are far less likely, for example, to 
attend community meetings related to village development, attend demonstrations or contact 
their local councilor or local party official for any matter. Interestingly, though, when they do 
                                                          
14
 Gerber and Green (2000a) reports on a randomized GOTV campaign conducted in New Haven, Connecticut, just 
prior to the 1998 election. The campaign delivered non-partisan messages through personal canvassing, direct 
mailings and telephone calls. The study found that personal canvassing had a substantially greater impact on voter 
turnout as compared with other modes of contact. Green et al., (2003) and Michelson (2003) find similar results.  
15
 See Jacoby and Mansuri (2011) 
16
 Table A2 indicates that both radio and TV are widely available and that if anything, women report higher access 
than men. Approximately, 42 percent of men and 47 percent of women had access to a radio and about 65 percent of 
men and 67 percent of women had access to a TV. 
10 
 
engage, women tend to avoid formal authority and reach out to traditional or religious leaders 
(66 percent among women compared to 49 among men).
17
  
2.2 Experimental Design and Data  
The timeline of the study is shown in Figure 1. The information campaign was carried out two 
weeks prior to the elections (from February 5
th
 to 15
th
 2008) by 8 teams consisting of one MRDO 
female staff and one female enumerator from RCONs each.
18
 Each sample village was covered 
in approximately one day and was divided into contiguous geographical clusters of 
approximately 40 households. A cluster was typically one or two contiguous streets in the 
village. Clusters were based on geography rather than other household characteristics such as 
caste or occupation of household head because restrictions to female mobility suggested that 
social interactions would be dictated by physical proximity.  Each cluster was then randomly 
assigned to receive the importance of voting message (T1), or T1 plus the secrecy of balloting 
message (T2) or nothing. The canvassing team selected one cluster in each village at random and 
began there. T1 was delivered in this cluster. Next, a gap cluster was left between two selected 
clusters. In the second selected cluster a coin toss determined whether T2 was delivered or all 
selected households were left as controls. The third selected cluster was then given the opposite 
treatment of the second cluster. A typical sample village had about 7 study clusters and 11 
geographical clusters in all, including gap clusters. The final sample has 67 clusters in total, 30 
assigned to T1, 27 assigned to T2 and 10 left as controls.
19
 Within each selected cluster, 
irrespective of the specific treatment, every 4
th
 household was selected and surveyed, starting at 
either end of the cluster. In T1 and T2 clusters, all selected households were assigned to the 
respective treatment, with the exception of every 5
th
 selected household which was left as a 
                                                          
17
 These statistics are also consistent with Pakistan‘s rather dismal performance on a range of development 
indicators. According to the 1998 Human Development Report, for example, Pakistan ranked 138 out of 174 on the 
Human Development Index (HDI), 131 out of 163 on the Gender Development Index (GDI), and 100 out of 102 on 
the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). 
18
 While RCONs team members were new in the villages, MRDO staff had been working in the area, although their 
coverage was still low. According to Table 1, only around 11 percent of the women in the sample were MRDO 
members. We ensured, however, that MRDO staff did not conduct the campaign in the villages where they had been 
working previously. MRDO staff was also not engaged in the collection of the follow-up data. When asked 
informally about whether women in the household they had visited to deliver the campaign had voted and for whom, 
they did not know. As a result, it is clear that MRDO staff did not have any authority over the household and there 
was no expectation that they would obtain future favors if they casted the vote.   
19
 We kept one randomly selected control cluster in the survey sample per village. In one larger village, two control 
clusters were included in the survey. 
11 
 
control. This generated 2 to 4 controls in each T1 and T2 cluster in addition to the households 
selected in the control clusters.  Thus, similar to Duflo and Saez (2003), the peer group is fixed 
by location and only a subset of the peer group in a treatment cluster is treated. In total, 2,735 
women from 1,018 households were reached. Figure 2 maps a section of a study village 
containing three clusters delimited by a white solid line. The dots, squares, stars and triangles 
indicate the location of the study households. A dot denotes a household in a control cluster, a 
square (star) denotes a treated household in a T1 (T2) cluster and a triangle is a control household 
in a treated cluster (either T1 or T2). These three clusters are mapped to a polling station whose 
location falls outside the map. 
 During the door-to-door visit, basic data on each sample household was collected, including the 
GPS location of the house, a basic roster of all adult women with their past voting record and the 
name and address of their closest friend or confidant in the village. The door-to-door visit lasted 
about 20 to 25 minutes for treated households and 5 to 10 minutes for control households. None 
of the households refused to participate in the awareness campaign or to be interviewed.  
A local woman, usually a school teacher, was also identified in each village during the awareness 
campaign to assist the canvassing team with the verification of voting, post-election, by checking 
the ink stain on each woman‘s hand. This woman was provided the list of sample women whose 
thumb mark needed to be verified on election day and the day after the election. This list 
included one confidant from each household. The confidant was  selected as follows: in every 
even numbered household, the confidant of a woman who was either a daughter or a daughter in 
law of the household head was selected, while in every odd numbered household, the confidant 
of the household head (if the head was a woman) or the head‘s wife, sister, mother or aunt was 
selected. Not all households yielded at least one ―eligible‖ woman using this rule, so the final 
sample includes 727 confidants whose vote was verified. 
Voting verification took place between the evening of February 18
th
, Election Day, and the 
evening of February 19
th
. The field teams visited each village on February 19
th
 to check 10 
percent of the verifier‘s assignment at random and found no significant differences.  
12 
 
During the verification exercise, the verifiers were unable to locate 98 women (and 27 
households).  This leaves us with a sample of 2,637 women and 991 households. We were able 
to verify all 727 confidants.  
Attrition of women was unrelated to treatment assignment (see Appendix Table A3), although 
we note that T2 households are more likely to attrit. Since the overall household attrition rate is 
very low (2.6 percent), this is not a source of concern.  In addition, 158 women claimed to have 
cast a vote but did not have the requisite ink mark. To be conservative, we treat these women as 
not having voted, although the results do not change if we consider them as voters.  
Verification was followed by a post-election survey of the same 2,637 women in March 2008. 
We ensured that the team of enumerators that visited a given household at follow-up was 
different from the one that had delivered the awareness campaign.  The survey collected 
information on household demographics, recall of the door-to-door visits, access to and use of 
various media, and knowledge of the balloting process and political candidates, among other 
issues. Finally, we collected the official electoral results by gender, candidate and political party 
for each of the 21 polling stations which served our sample villages.
20
  
Average turnout among women in our sample is 59 percent, while female turnout in the 21 
polling stations is 47.3 percent. At the constituency level, total turnout was 39.2 percent in 
Khairpur and 48.6 percent in Sukkur. The corresponding turnout rate (including both males and 
females) in the sample polling stations was 41.7 percent and 43 percent, respectively. While 
there is significant variation in contestation at the polling station level, the share of PPPP at the 
constituency level was a large 70 percent in Khairpur and 73 percent in Sukkur.   
Table 2 reports the difference in means of household and woman characteristics across different 
samples. See Appendix Table A1 for the definition of the variables used in the paper. Column 1 
in Panel A compares treated households to all control households, irrespective of whether they 
live in treated or control clusters. Columns 2 and 3 compare T1 and T2 households, respectively, 
to all control households. Column 4 compares all households in treated clusters (both treated and 
control households) to those in control clusters, Column 5 compares treated households to 
                                                          
20
 Results by gender are tabulated at each polling station. This is possible because in Pakistan polling areas and 
polling booths are separated by gender. 
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households in control clusters only and finally Column 6 compares control households in treated 
clusters to households in control clusters. Overall, there is little difference in household 
characteristics across samples. Treated households have a little more land than control 
households in some comparisons, but no difference in assets or housing quality. The P-value of 
an F-test that all variables are jointly insignificant can never be rejected. In Panel B, the same 
comparisons are reported for woman characteristics. Women in treated households are somewhat 
younger in some comparisons and have more young children as a result. They also appear to 
have less access to cable TV, perhaps due to their lower mobility.  An F-test that all woman level 
variables are jointly insignificant cannot be rejected in 4 out of 6 comparisons. In the analysis we 
control for all household and woman characteristics that lack balance across treatment and 
control groups. 
Appendix Table A4 suggests that the intervention was successfully implemented: all treated 
women correctly recall having received a visit and none of the control households do. In 
addition, most treated women correctly recall the content of the messages delivered. Finally, 
control women in treated clusters are far more likely to report talking to their neighbors about 
political issues related to party or candidate positions and the importance of voting in accordance 
with one‘s own preferences, providing the first piece of evidence of information spillovers.   
Follow-up data also suggest that there were no major incidents during Election Day in the study 
villages.
21
 Virtually all sample women had possession of their National Identification Cards 
(NICs) before they left for the polling station and ninety percent of the women who voted also 
found that the instructions in the polling station were appropriately displayed and that no one 
else was present inside the booth when they cast their vote. While most women (61 percent) 
travelled on foot, a substantial number (26 percent) used transportation provided by a political 
party, which is legal in Pakistan. However, almost all women went to the polling station with 
others. The majority were accompanied by female household members (62 percent), or a female 
friend or relative (25 percent). The rest went with their spouses or another household male.  
 
                                                          
21
  In contrast, media reports from the northwest of the country indicate that several female polling stations remained 
empty because village elders actively prevented women from voting (AP, February 18th, 2008). 
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3. Empirical Strategy and Results 
3.1 Turnout and Information Spillovers 
Because treatment is assigned randomly at the geographical cluster level, its impact on female 
turnout can be estimated via the following OLS regression equation: 
                                      (1) 
where        indicates whether woman i in household h in cluster c in polling station p in village 
v is verified as having voted (1=Yes),       is the treatment indicator (1 if woman i in household 
h in cluster c in polling station p in village v received the voting awareness campaign), and  
       is a vector of polling station, household and individual woman characteristics. We follow 
Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) and include household and woman characteristics from Table 2 that 
lack balance (total land owned, age, access to cable, number of children under 5 years old) as 
well as variables which are likely to influence voting behavior such as zaat (caste), having an 
NIC, mobility, schooling and whether the women seeks advice from a religious leader or ―Pir‖.22  
Finally, we include in        the total number of women registered to vote in the polling station. 
Inclusion of        corrects for baseline imbalances and increases efficiency by absorbing 
residual variation in the data.
23
 We also include a village fixed effect    to remove the influence 
of village specific unobservable characteristics. The term        is a mean-zero error. Since the 
unit of randomization is the geographical cluster, standard errors are always clustered at this 
level (Moulton 1986).  
A modified version of Equation (1) measures the effect of T1 and T2 separately: 
                                                 (2) 
The coefficients           capture the impact of treatment on turnout and are the main 
coefficients of interest. 
                                                          
22 
Although the NIC is required to vote, some women in our sample were verified as having voted, though they did 
not have an NIC.  
23
 Some of the variables were collected at baseline, prior to the campaign, while others were collected in the follow 
up survey. In either case, they are not characteristics that could be affected by the campaign. 
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Table 3 reports the results. In order to capture the importance of within cluster spillovers, we run 
Equation (1) in Panel A and Equation (2) in Panel B using four different subsamples. In column 
1, we simply compare treated women to all control women, regardless of their location 
(comparison T-C). This comparison ignores spillovers altogether by grouping control women in 
treated clusters together with (control) women in control clusters. In column 2, we compare 
treated clusters with control clusters (comparison TN-CN). Here treated and control women in 
treated households are grouped together. In column 3, we compare treated women in treated 
clusters with women in control clusters (comparison T-CN). We therefore drop from the analysis 
control women in treated clusters. Finally, in column 4 we compare control women in treated 
clusters to women in control clusters by dropping treated women from the analysis (comparison 
CTN-CN). If spillover effects are important, the coefficient of interest in the first (naïve) 
comparison should be smaller since control women in treated clusters are likely to have been 
influenced by treated women.  
We indeed find that the naïve estimate in column 1, panel A, is lower than that of columns 2-4, at 
6 percent. Thus, accounting for within geographical cluster spillovers increases the impact of 
treatment to about 12 percent. More importantly, control women in treated clusters are about as 
likely to vote as directly treated women.
24
 In Panel B, the pattern of lower estimates in column 1 
compared to those in columns 2-4 is repeated and, as expected, estimates for the impact of T2 are 
larger. They are also more precisely estimated, although we are unable to detect statistically 
different effects between T1 and T2.
25
  
While this strategy allows us to assess spillovers within treatment clusters effectively, it does not 
account for spillovers beyond the geographical cluster. It is plausible that women talk to other 
women outside the geographical cluster, especially women located near the boundary of the 
cluster. The design included gap clusters to ensure that control clusters were isolated from 
treated clusters, but women in these control clusters might have been affected directly or 
                                                          
24
 A regression that includes both a treatment dummy and a dummy for control households in treated clusters shows 
that the coefficient on the treatment dummy is 0.117 and the coefficient on the dummy for control households in 
treated clusters is 0.124, though neither coefficient is statistically significant at conventional levels. The P-value of 
the t-test that both coefficients are equal is 0.798. 
25
 The impact of information on turnout for friends is in the same range as that for other control women in treated 
clusters, ranging from 10 to 12 percent. This is not surprising given that the vast majority of confidants reside in the 
same cluster as the woman who identified them as her friend. 
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indirectly by the intervention and, as a result, even the estimates of columns 2-4 in Table 3 could 
be downward biased.  
We use two strategies to assess spillover effects beyond the geographical cluster. First, we use 
the GPS location of every household in the study to compute the number of other treated and 
control households within a given distance radius and run the following OLS regression 
equation: 
                                                (3) 
Where         is an indicator for whether household h is not treated but has at least one treated 
household within a distance radius of d meters, and      is the total number of surveyed 
households within distance radius d of household h.
26
 According to Table 1, the average distance 
between any two households in a cluster is 194.2 meters (0.12 miles) and the median distance is 
roughly 100 meters. In contrast, the median distance between any two surveyed households in a 
village is roughly one kilometer (0.67 miles). We consequently use a radius of 75, 100 and 200 
meters, which corresponds roughly to the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the distance between 
any two households within a cluster. The rest of the terms are as defined in Equation (1), and as 
before, standard errors are clustered at the geographical cluster level. The coefficients of interest 
are   and  . This specification allows for a simple test of the extent to which female turnout 
among control households near treated households resembles female turnout among directly 
treated households. 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results from Equation (3). The treatment effects are robustly 
significant and range between 12 to 15 percent. The estimate of   is also significant in columns 1 
and 2, and is comparable to the direct treatment effect, suggesting that geographical spillovers 
are large. Indeed, the t-test for     is never rejected. The coefficient on the number of 
households within a given radius, which can be interpreted as household density, is significant in 
columns 2 and 3, suggesting that turnout is higher in more densely populated areas within a 
village, perhaps because polling stations tend to locate there. Panel B reports the results for the 
                                                          
26 It is clear that the dummies       and        cannot both take value 1, since households are either treated or not. 
Both dummies take value zero if the household was not treated (       ) and was located more than d meters 
from the closest treated household. 
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OLS regression equation analogous to Equation (2). We again find that the direct (and indirect) 
effect of T2 is somewhat larger than that of T1 but the difference is, again, not statistically 
significant, at conventional levels, in our sample. 
The other strategy we use to study spillover effects beyond the geographical cluster is inspired 
by Kremer and Miguel (2001). In order to assess how treatment density within a given radius 
affects turnout, we rely on exogenous variation in the local density of treated women, by virtue 
of the cluster level randomization.
27
  Specifically, we construct non-overlapping concentric rings 
that are 200 meters wide around each sample woman. For each ring (or band) we compute the 
number of treated women within the band, as well as the total number of sample women. Since 
the median distance between any two households in the village is about one kilometer, the bands 
start at 0-200 meters and extend up to 1,200 meters. The regression specification in this case is  
                                                        (4) 
Where      is the number of treated women between distance d and D from each sample 
woman, and     is the number of women interviewed between distance d and D from each 
sample woman. The rest of the terms are as defined in Equation (1) and standard errors are 
clustered at the geographical cluster level.  
The estimates for     can be used to estimate the average spillover gain for sample women from 
having treated women residing in close proximity. The coefficients are reported in Column 2 of 
Table 5. Spillover effects are significant up to 1,000 meters. The number of treated women 
ranges from 0 to about 161 women, with the largest number of treated women in the 0-200 meter 
range. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 report the mean and median number of treated women. Using 
only the coefficients that are significant, we estimate a mean increase in the odds of voting of 68 
percent and a median increase of 45 percent.
28
  Consistent with our earlier results, once 
proximity to other treated women is controlled for, the residual effect of being directly treated is 
nil (i.e.   ). Clearly, social interactions among women with mobility constraints are largely 
                                                          
27
 Kremer and Miguel (2001) assess cross-school externalities using exogenous variation in the local density of 
treatment school pupils generated by the school-level randomization.  
28 To see this, note that the spillover gain is the average number of treated women located within 0-200 meters times 
the average effect of having an additional treated woman in this range (        plus the analogous spillover effects 
due to treated women located between 200-400, 400-600, 600-800 and 800-1,000 meters from a woman. 
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dictated by geographic proximity. Communication is easy and can happen over laundry, cooking 
and childcare which require little movement away from home. 
Finally, we assess the size of information spillovers at the polling station level, using official 
electoral results by gender. Using polling station level information allows us to look at spillovers 
for all registered voters in the village and to check potential spillover effects of the information 
campaign on both men and women. Sample villages have between 1 and 3 polling stations each 
and the average distance of households from their matched polling station is roughly one 
kilometer (see Table 1). The outcome of interest in this case,     is the turnout rate in polling 
station p in village v, that is, the number of votes cast by women (men) divided by the number of 
registered women (men). Correspondingly, the impact of treatment,     , is the share of treated 
women measured as the number of women treated in polling station p in village v divided by the 
number of registered women.
29
 We include a vector of polling station level variables,     to 
control for polling station level differences. This yields the following regression specification: 
                          (5) 
Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 6 show that an increase in the share of treated women in 
the polling station increases female turnout by 86 to 99 percent, depending on whether polling 
station controls are included. This provides further confirmation of the size and significance of 
the spillover effects we find in Table 5.
30
 In contrast, there is no effect for male turnout (Table 6, 
columns 3 and 4). The fact that men are not influenced by information provided to women could 
reflect men‘s greater exposure to political information, wider networks or simply lack of 
effective communication between men and women on political issues.  
3.2 Candidate Choice  
We now turn to the impact of the awareness campaign on candidate choice. Table 7 reports the 
results of specifications (1) and (2) above where        now indicates whether woman i in 
household h in cluster c in polling station p in village v reported voting for PPPP and is verified 
as having voted. As before, the estimates in column 1 compare treated households to control 
                                                          
29
 The variable      ranges from 0 to 0.77. 
30
 Note that the results from Table 5 indicate that spillover effects are significant up to one kilometer, on average. 
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households in both treated and control clusters. They do not account for spillover effects and as a 
result, the coefficient is about one third smaller in magnitude than those of columns 2-4 which do 
account for spillover effects. Panel A shows that on average, the campaign reduced the 
probability of voting for PPPP by about 15 to 22 percentage points. In Panel B, the impacts for 
T2 are again larger in absolute value and more precisely estimated than those of T1, but we 
cannot reject the null that the estimates are equal.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B of Table 6 confirm these results at the polling station level. The 
share of treated women in a polling station reduces the PPPP female vote share. In particular, a 
10 percent increase in the share of treated women led to a reduction of 6 percent in the share of 
PPPP female votes. Similar to the turnout results of Panel A, columns 3 and 4 of Panel B show 
that the campaign had no effect on the PPPP male vote share. Given that the awareness campaign 
did not mention any candidate or party by name, the fact that it appears to have affected not just 
turnout, but also party vote shares is remarkable and could have important policy consequences. 
One plausible explanation for the impact on the party vote shares is that in an environment where 
one party (the PPPP) was likely to get a landslide, the campaign may have induced women 
supporters of PML-F to vote in greater numbers, thereby increasing the share of PML-F, 
although the PML-F is not reputed to be pro-women in any way. 
With these results in hand, we now turn to a more direct test of the relevance of the information 
content of the campaign by assessing the quality of information possessed by the male head on 
the candidate choice of women in his household.  In the follow-up survey, the male head was 
asked about whether or not each woman in the household had voted and, if she had, whom she 
had voted for. The same information was solicited from each woman about all the other women 
in the household. Using these unique data, we can check the extent to which these cross-reports, 
i.e., the reporter‘s choice of candidates for a woman, are in agreement with the candidate choice 
reported by the woman herself. The indicator of agreement takes the value 1 if the two reports 
match, and is zero otherwise.
31
 Candidate choice information is available for all women who 
                                                          
31 If the reporter stated that a woman did not vote when she reported voting and was verified as doing so, the 
agreement indicator is coded as missing. This is the case for less than 5 percent of the reports by men and roughly 
one percent of the reports by other women. Likewise, if the reporter answers ―I don‘t know‖ when asked whom a 
given woman voted for, we code the agreement indicator as missing. This is the case for 7 out of 1,421 reports by 
men (less than 0.5 percent) and only one report by other women. We follow this approach because lack of 
knowledge about a woman‘s voting behavior could reflect either indifference or freedom to select whomever she 
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self-report that they voted, but we restrict the sample to women who were verified as having 
voted. The final sample includes 3,713 cross reports and 1,220 women, with the number of 
observations per woman varying by household size.
32
 
If the campaign successfully conveyed information on the secrecy of the ballot then household 
members, and particularly the male head, should have less information on the candidate choice 
of women in the household. We test this with the following regression 
                                                                (6) 
where        is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the report of individual i on individual j‘s 
choice of candidate is correct (according to j‘s self-report);        is an indicator for whether 
reporter i is the male head; and        is reporter i‘s vector of polling station, household and 
individual characteristics. The error term is likely to be correlated across all observations with 
the same reporter i and reportee j, but we still cluster standard errors at the geographical cluster 
level, which is more conservative than using QAP (Krackhardt, 1988) or the correction in 
Fafchamps and Gubert (2006). 
The results are presented in Table 8. The coefficient of interest is    which captures the 
differential effect of treatment on the quality of male reports about the candidate choice of 
women in the household. The results indicate that treatment reduces male knowledge about 
women‘s chosen candidates by about 8 percentage points. As before, effects are larger and 
measured more precisely for T2. Interestingly, the reduction in male knowledge is larger and 
significant for controls in treated clusters (column 3) and is the only instance where the effects 
for T2 are significantly different from T1 (p-value=0.067). These results are consistent with 
reported conversations on political matters with neighbors in Panel B of Table A4.  Controls in 
treated clusters are far more likely to discuss political issues with their neighbors as compared to 
women in control clusters and are equally likely to do so when compared to directly treated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
desires. Given the low percentage, results do not change if we recode them with a value 0. Note that out of the 1,220 
women who report having voted, and were verified as doing so, only one declined to answer whom she voted for. 
32
 Among the 2,637 women in the sample, 1,543 were verified as having voted. The discrepancy in sample sizes of 
voters come from 21 percent of women that were verified as having voted but self-reported as not having done so. 
Interestingly, we also find evidence of conformity bias (Silver et al., 1986; Harbaugh, 1996) since treated women 
that had not voted are significantly more likely to self-report as having done so compared to women in control 
clusters (40.6 percent vs. 34.8 percent, p-value= 0.001). This is especially true in more contested polling stations 
(45.3 percent vs. 35.8 percent, p-value= 0.000).  
21 
 
women. This confirms the importance of the information provided in the campaign. Even the 
more nuanced message about the secrecy of the ballot was apparently conveyed to women not 
directly treated. 
Table A5 complements these results by comparing the turnout and candidate choice of treated 
women with women in control clusters.
33
 Columns 1 and 2 suggest that treated women are more 
likely to vote and to do so precisely for a party (candidate) other than that of the male head (from 
2.8 to 10.1 percent). We then check whether the information campaign affected women who had 
no prior voting experience. The results in columns 4-9 suggest that this is not the case. 
Apparently, the intervention increased independent choice mainly among women who had voted 
in the past. As it turns out, women without a prior voting history are also much less likely to 
possess NIC cards or be registered to vote and are significantly younger. Since the time between 
the information campaign and the election was too short to allow for the acquisition of an NIC or 
a change in registration status, this is perhaps not surprising. However, it is also possible that 
these women face other barriers to participation.  
3.3 Knowledge and Perceptions 
An important question, given the large effects we find on turnout and candidate choice, is the 
extent to which the campaign affected women‘s knowledge about political issues, perceptions 
and behavior other than voting. Each cell in Table 9 reports the coefficient on the treatment 
dummy from a regression analogous to Equation (1). The dependent variables are the average of 
two knowledge questions on current events, an index of pro democratic views, for example 
disagreement with "Only educated should vote" and disapproval of various forms of government 
such as "Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office" or "The army comes in 
to govern the country". (Appendix Table A1 describes all variables in detail). A higher index is 
associated with more pro-democratic views. We consider three additional questions: whether the 
woman checked her name in the voter list after the intervention and before Election Day; 
whether the woman believes that elections were free and fair and finally whether the woman had 
witnessed or heard about instances of violence in the village. 
                                                          
33
 The results are very similar when comparing treated clusters versus control clusters or controls in treated clusters 
versus control clusters and hence are omitted. 
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The results suggest that treated women were more likely to check if their name was in the voter 
list but were not more knowledgeable about current events nor did they have more pro-
democratic views. Interestingly, columns 5-6 provide strong evidence of cognitive dissonance in 
voting. Women in control clusters were less likely to report that elections were free and fair and 
were more likely to report instances of violence. Given that control clusters were randomly 
located in the village, it is hard to believe that violence was concentrated precisely in these 
clusters. Rather, women in control clusters seem to justify their (non-)voting behavior ex-post by 
delegitimizing the election process and by reporting more security concerns. 
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis  
The estimates from tables 3 and 6 can be used to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the 
information campaign. The initial development of the campaign cost $3,600. The training of the 
canvassing team cost $753 and the delivery of the information campaign cost $5,671. This last 
amount includes the costs of collecting basic information about treatment and control households 
which would not be incurred in practice if research was not being conducted. Since roughly two-
thirds of sample households were treated, we impute the costs to include 2/3rd of this amount in 
the intervention cost. This gives us a total intervention cost of roughly $8,130, including the 
costs of developing the information campaign and training enumerators. This is an overestimate 
since the development of the information campaign and the training of canvassing teams 
represent a fixed cost that can be sizeable if the scale is small. In our case, it constitutes over 50 
percent of the overall cost—which if the campaign were scaled up, would be distributed over a 
much larger population base. We therefore present the cost under two scenarios: inclusive of the 
development of the campaign and enumerator training costs; and based only on the labor and 
transport costs of delivering the campaign.  
Since we have about 673 treated households, we get a cost of about $5.6 per household using 
variable costs only, and $12 per household if we include fixed costs. This implies a cost per vote 
of $2.3 ($4.9 if we include fixed costs).
34
 To see this note that a household has 2.7 women on 
average, so we treat about 10 women for every 3.7 households visited. Since the cost of treating 
3.7 households is about $21 ($44 if we include fixed costs), and this yields 9 additional votes, the 
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 This is about Rs. 201 (Rs. 453 including fixed costs), using the exchange rate in February 2008.  
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implied per vote cost is about $2.3 ($4. 9). If we ignore spillover effects and use woman level 
estimates, we would obtain a cost per vote of $17.5 ($36.7).
35
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper examines the role of pre-election voter information campaigns in inducing broader 
participation in one of the largest new democracies of the world. We focus on two related 
questions. First, does a lack of information on the electoral process and voting procedures 
constitute an important barrier to political participation by women? Second, to what extent can 
social interactions among women be instrumental in fostering participation beyond those directly 
targeted by the information campaign?  
 
We find overwhelmingly positive answers to both questions. Turnout among women that 
received the information campaigned increased by about 12 percent on average, which amounts 
to little more than one additional female vote for every 10 women or about 4 households treated. 
We also find evidence of independent candidate choice. In treated households, men were 
significantly less likely to correctly assess the candidate choices made by women in their 
households. In addition, treated women were more likely to vote for a different party than the 
male head, especially among women who had voted in the past. Treated women also voted in 
larger numbers for PML-F which was seen as less likely to win, thereby changing the vote share 
of the losing party in sample polling stations. This is perhaps even more remarkable given that 
the field teams were mostly PPPP supporters. This suggests that the intervention empowered 
women and thus may have modified the rational calculus of voting (Downs, 1957) by including a 
utility gain from the mere act of voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). Consistent with this utility 
gain from voting, women in the randomly assigned control clusters are more likely to report that 
elections were unfair (and to recall higher instances of violence) in an attempt to justify not 
casting a vote ex-post. Among women who had not voted in the past, the campaign proved to be 
less effective. More intensive interventions may be required for such women, including 
assistance with voter registration.  
 
                                                          
35
 Green and Gerber (2004) provide a nice summary of the price-per-vote in the US using various methods. They 
estimate the cost of a vote in door-to-door campaigns, which are perhaps closest to what we do, to be around $19 per 
vote using contract labor but ignoring spillover effects.  
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We also find evidence of large spillover effects dictated by geographic proximity. Control 
women in treated clusters respond to cluster treatment assignment about as much as do directly 
treated women. Moving beyond clusters we examine spatial spillovers more generally and find 
still larger peer effects. The importance of spillover effects and peer pressure resonates well with 
the theoretical literature on voter turnout that emphasizes the role of the group in coordinating 
participation either because group members are rewarded by leaders or because they each believe 
they are ethically obliged to vote and reinforce one another (see Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999 and 
Feddersen, 2004 for a review). 
 
The presence of significant spillovers alters the cost benefit analysis quite substantially. An 
additional vote costs more than seven times as much as it does in the absence of spillovers. 
Given the relatively low cost of an additional vote ($2.3, using variable costs only), information 
campaigns appear to be a relatively cost effective way of increasing turnout among poor rural 
women. 
 
While voter awareness campaigns are a staple feature of developed democracies they are 
relatively rare in younger and emerging democracies and we are not aware of any other studies 
that systematically examine the prospects of such interventions for increasing women‘s 
engagement in public life in a developing country context. Arguably, though, the value of 
information is likely to be greater in a context where voters have less knowledge about the policy 
positions taken by candidates or parties and are engaged in various clientelist relationships that 
influence voting decisions. Access to reliable information is likely to be an even greater barrier 
for women, who are generally more constrained by lack of education, lower levels of mobility 
and less exposure to public spaces in which political ideas can be developed.  
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Appendix A: Visit Script 
Importance of Voting (T1) 
 
Picture 1:  Ask “In your opinion, who do you consider responsible for the situation shown in this picture?” If women respond that 
politician, feudal lords, bureaucrats and influential personalities, etc. then clarify that in fact you may be responsible for this state. 
Also, responsible are all those who do not cast a vote or choose a wrong candidate. You are the ones who empower them. Hence you 
need to understand how you can individually affect the decision of who finds solutions to your problems/issues. Do realize your power 
and importance of your vote?  
 
Picture 2: Ask “Could your one vote bring a change in your life?” Explain that your vote is of great importance. Through this vote a 
representative is elected. It is this elected representative who then sits in the provincial or national Assembly and makes decisions with 
regard to what facilities are provided in your area with regard to education, health, security, roads, income earning options, etc.  
 
Picture 3: Many women think that casting a vote makes no difference. Ask women what they think. If they respond that they are 
women or are underprivileged and therefore it will make no difference, stress that every Pakistani vote is of equal importance, 
regardless of whether the voter is rich or poor, male or female. If they as women do not cast their vote then individuals who have no 
interest in women related issues may get elected. Tell the women that there is a lot of power in their vote. People consider that women 
are weak. Should all Pakistani women begin to vote, their vote has the power to alter a Government!  
 
Picture 4: Ask the women whether they are aware that when they cast a vote in the General Elections, they actually select two 
members: one for the large assembly, which is known as the “National Assembly” on the green ballot paper; and the second for the 
small assembly which is “Provincial Assembly” on the white ballot paper. Both the assemblies work separately, with different 
domains and duties assigned.  
 
Picture 5: Explain that the major responsibility of the members of the national assembly is legislation. Like setting-up laws for the 
protection of women rights; establishing law for peace and stability in the country; relations with foreign countries and construction of 
major roads. Reiterate that the color of ballot for the member of national assembly is green.  
 
Picture 6: Ask women whether they know about the responsibilities of the members of the provincial assembly. Explain that 
provincial assembly member has a more direct link to the area they live in. It is this member’s responsibility to ensure the provision of 
facilities such as girls and boys’ schools, health centers, irrigation and small and home based industries. Remind women that the color 
of ballot for the member of provincial assembly is white.  
 
Remind women that in the pictures previously shown they must have noted that the members of National and Provincial Assemblies 
are tasked with a lot of work for local and national progress. Ask women whether they think “good” candidates should have specific 
qualities in order to be effective at their job. Encourage active participation. Then, show Picture 7 and list the characteristics of an 
effective candidate: educated, well reputed, respected for their good character and benevolent to poor; interested to promote projects 
that will reduce poverty; ability to understand problems; not misused national resources in the past; and have a positive attitude.  
 
Ask women whether they have information about all the candidates that are contesting elections from their constituency. Show 
Picture 8 and ask women about their impression. Explain that there may be many women who do not know about the candidates that 
are contesting in their constituency. How then can they compare the qualities of the candidates in order to decide who is the best 
candidate?   
 
Ask women if they would cast their vote. If “Yes” then ask how they would decide whom to vote for. “Do they have enough 
information about all the members?” and “Do they really know who the best candidate is?” If “Not” then ask where they would obtain 
information about the candidates.  Show Picture 9 and tell them where information about the candidates could be obtained, e.g. male 
members within the family (since they are more aware and exposed), neighbors, teachers/respected members of the community and 
party workers.  
 
Picture 10: Ask women what they see. The picture is self explanatory, showing a before and after behavior of a candidate – before the 
election the candidate is humble and attentive. After the election they just whisk off without even acknowledging your presence! Ask 
the women if this has happened to them. Highlight that this happens when one does not get correct information about the member and 
thus one chooses the wrong candidate.  Ask women if they ever wonder “why cast a vote when nobody has done anything for us so 
far? Everyone is the same and all exploit resources.” Tell women that they may have had bad experiences, but it is still important to 
keep the electoral process alive. Show Picture 11 and explain that one can select the best amongst the lot – and only then will better 
candidates come forward. This would make clear to the member that you cast your vote sensibly. If this practice continues then soon 
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sincere people would also contest elections and we would vote for them because of their genuine attributes. (Just as shown in Picture 
7). 
 
Secrecy of Balloting (T2) 
Tell women that we have so far established that voting is important. But does everyone have to vote for the same person? Tell women 
that even when two sisters go to the market to buy a dress, they generally come away with two different designs, colors, and fabric. 
Why does this happen? Because people may have different preferences. 
 
Explain that secrecy is a legal right and responsibility of every citizen. When you vote, you have the right to keep your vote 
confidential. No one may see you cast your vote, not even the election commission staff, polling agent, or another voter. It is only if a 
voter has a disability such as weak eyesight or a physical problem that can prevent you from stamping the ballot paper that you may 
seek assistance. Otherwise, any other presence would be considered illegal. Lack of ability to read or write does not justify any kind of 
assistance (since one does not need to read or write to understand the ballot paper).  Show Picture 12 and explain the basic process of 
balloting as follows: (i) Voter enters the polling station; (ii) Polling officer inspects National ID Card; marks thumb with indelible ink 
and after calling the name and serial number of the voter, marks off her name from electoral list; (iii) The First Presiding Officer 
issues a ballot paper for the national assembly. She stamps and signs it on the reverse side and marks the counterfoil; (iv) The Second 
Presiding Officer issues ballot paper for provincial assembly. She stamps and signs it on the reverse side, and marks the counterfoil; 
(v) Voter goes to the polling booth and stamps on both the ballot papers; (vi) Voter puts her ballot in the specified ballot boxes; (vii) 
Voter leaves the polling station.  
 
Tell the women that to keep voting confidential, all polling stations will be equipped with a Voter Screen. This screen will ensure that 
no one sees you while stamping the ballot paper. Show Picture 13 and highlight that the Election Commission has undertaken special 
arrangements to make voting easy for women – e.g. separate polling stations for women, female polling staff, and ensuring that 
polling stations and polling booths are located in easy to reach places, e.g. nearby schools.  
 
Show Picture 14 and explain the right procedure of balloting. Show how the ballot should be stamped and more importantly folded, 
and then put in the appropriate ballot box i.e. green ballot paper into green ballot box and white ballot paper into the white ballot box.  
 
Ask the women, how many of them have voted before? Ask them how they have felt after casting the vote? Some may say nervous or 
afraid while others may say satisfied. Show Picture 15 and explain that as shown in the picture, once a voter comes out everyone is 
interested in knowing whom she has voted for. Tell the women that this should not make them anxious or nervous. If they want, they 
can make everyone happy! 
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Appendix B: Visual Aids 
 
Who is responsible for the situation shown in the picture? 
 
 
Every Pakistanis vote is of equal importance; regardless 
whether the voter is rich or poor, male or female 
 
 
Major responsibilities of members of the National 
Assembly are: 
a. Setting-up laws for the protection of women rights;  
b. Establishing law for peace and stability in the country;  
c. Relations with foreign countries and 
d. Construction of major roads 
 
Elected representatives make decisions about 
developmental activities. 
 
One vote casted results in selection of two members; one 
from National Assembly and other from Provincial 
Assembly. a. National assembly; b. Provincial assembly 
 
Responsibilities of the members of provincial assembly 
are to ensure: 
a. Provision of facilities such as girls & boys schools,  
b. Health centers,  
c. Irrigation and  
d. Small and home based industries in their own areas 
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Characteristics of effective member are: 
a. Interested to promote projects that will reduce 
poverty; 
b. Well reputed,  
c. Not misused national resources in the past; 
d. Respected for their good character;  
e. Has a positive attitude towards poor 
f. Ability to understand problems; 
g. Educated, 
 
9. Getting information about the candidate from: 
a. Neighbors, 
b. Male members within the family  
c. Party workers 
d. Teachers/respected members of the community   
 
11. One has to choose the best from the lot available. 
 
Who are the candidates contesting elections from their 
constituency? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Pre-election, Post-election 
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12. The importance and confidentiality of the Voting 
Process 
 
 
 
14. Stamp against the symbol/name of your chosen 
political candidate and place the vote in the ballot box 
 
Separate Polling Arrangements for Women  
(from right to left) 
1. Female Polling Agent 
2. Separate Polling Space for Women  
3. Male Polling Station  
4. Female Polling Station 
 
 
15. Don’t be afraid after casting your vote! 
 
Figure 1: Timeline 
 
 
HH visits and 
Pre-Election 
Survey
Voting 
Verification
Post-Election 
Survey
National 
Elections
Feb 18 Feb 18-19Feb 5 -15 March 5-25 
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Figure 2: Section of Village with geographical clusters 
 
Notes: The solid white lines delimit a geographical cluster. A square represents the location of a T1 household, a star 
represents a T2 household and a dot represents a control household in a control cluster. A triangle represents a control 
household in a treated cluster (either T1 or T2).  
 
N. Obs Mean St. Dev Pct 10 Pct. 50 Pct. 90
Panel A: Polling Station Characteristics
Number of women registered in each polling station 21 434.0 196.7 195.0 464.0 656.0
Number of treated women in each polling station 21 89.0 54.2 34.0 82.0 150.0
Share of treated women 21 0.24 0.19 0.07 0.22 0.43
Turnout for women 21 0.58 0.27 0.30 0.54 0.91
Turnout for men 21 0.49 0.15 0.32 0.51 0.66
Share of PPPP among female voters 21 0.62 0.26 0.39 0.66 0.88
Share PPPP among male voters 21 0.63 0.25 0.33 0.67 0.93
Percentage of women with access to cable in the polling station 21 0.34 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.75
St. Dev of asset index 21 1.76 0.30 1.46 1.72 2.09
St. Dev of distance index 21 0.79 0.52 0.16 0.69 1.31
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Household size 963 10.2 5.17 5 9 16
Number of women in the household 1 991 2.69 1.48 1 2 5
Asset Index 963 0.00 1.85 -2.03 -0.49 2.66
Total owned land (in acres) 963 2.58 7.55 0.01 0.04 7.02
Average monthly expenditure (in Rs. thousands) 963 8.80 4.71 3.00 9.00 12.50
House quality index 963 0.00 1.38 -1.62 -0.32 1.97
Low Zaat Status 963 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
Received visit from political party staff prior to election (1=Yes) 963 0.75 0.43 0 1 1
Attended political rally before intervention (1=Yes) 963 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Distance to polling station (Km.) 1 991 0.97 0.91 0 1 2
Distance between households within geographical cluster (meters) 8,263 194.2 283.9 27.9 107.1 456.5
Distance between households within village (meters) 48,430 1,472.9 1,304.9 109.4 1,070.5 2,962.8
Panel C: Woman Characteristics
Age 2,637 37.76 16.09 20 35 60
Woman has formal schooling (1=Yes) 2,637 0.18 0.39 0 0 1
Attended political rally before intervention (1=Yes) 2,637 0.80 0.40 0 1 1
Number of children under 5 years old 2,637 0.86 1.19 0 0 3
Woman has a National Identity Card (NIC or CNIC) (1=Yes) 2,637 0.70 0.46 0 1 1
Woman voted in last local elections (1=Yes)  1 2,735 0.70 0.46 0 1 1
Access to radio (1=Yes) 2,637 0.48 0.50 0 0 1
Access to TV (1=Yes) 2,637 0.70 0.46 0 1 1
Access to cable (1=Yes) 2,637 0.30 0.46 0 0 1
Mobility Index (0 to 3) 2,637 2.17 0.42 2 2 3
Woman allowed to join an NGO (1=Yes) 2,637 0.73 0.44 0 1 1
Woman is a member of MRDO (1=Yes) 1 2,735 0.11 0.31 0 0 1
Woman seeks advice from a religious leader or "Pir" (1=Yes) 2,637 0.64 0.48 0 1 1
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Notes: 1 indicates that the variable is created using only the sample from the pre-election visit. Variables are defined in Appendix 
Table A1.
Treatment vs 
control households
Treatment 1 vs 
control 
households
Treatment 2 vs 
control 
households
Treated 
clusters vs 
control clusters
Treated 
households vs 
households in 
control clusters
Control households 
in treated clusters 
vs households in 
control clusters
T-C T1-C T2-C TN-CN T-CN CTN-CN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Household Characteristics
Household size 0.266 0.289 0.227 0.412 0.422 0.371
(0.334) (0.382) (0.400) (0.433) (0.417) (0.546)
Number of women in the household 1 0.096 0.11 0.088 0.054 0.074 -0.044
(0.104) (0.123) (0.114) (0.145) (0.139) (0.165)
Asset index 0.017 0.061 -0.036 -0.086 -0.063 -0.188
(0.132) (0.146) (0.181) (0.204) (0.202) (0.195)
Total owned land (in acres) 1.018** 1.360** 0.6 0.754 0.943 -0.16
(0.428) (0.528) (0.512) (0.543) (0.572) (0.388)
Average monthly expenditure 473.211 470.616 444.17 267.484 367.439 -297.676
(403.795) (441.530) (440.550) (591.398) (608.246) (510.030)
House quality index -0.054 -0.078 -0.023 -0.211* -0.192 -0.314**
(0.098) (0.121) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.138)
Distance to polling station (Km) -0.013 -0.036 0.011 0.137 0.108 0.277*
(0.081) (0.082) (0.115) (0.137) (0.129) (0.162)
Low Zaat status 0.026 0.014 0.034 0.063 0.061 0.086
(0.059) (0.070) (0.067) (0.101) (0.099) (0.069)
Received visit from political party staff prior to election 
(1=Yes) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.015*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Attended political rally before intervention (1=Yes) 0.032 0.003 0.070* 0.050 0.051 0.043
(0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049)
N. Observations 972 676 588 972 845 292
P-value F test joint significance 0.340 0.635 0.971 0.799 0.754 0.466
Panel B: Woman Characteristics
Age -0.730 -0.872 -0.674 -1.410** -1.382** -1.533**
(0.167) (0.139) (0.272) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033)
Woman has formal schooling (1=Yes) 0.007 -0.002 0.025 0.015 0.016 0.020
(0.723) (0.915) (0.274) (0.616) (0.587) (0.596)
Woman is married (1=Yes) -0.007 -0.020 0.005 -0.017 -0.016 -0.019
(0.641) (0.229) (0.802) (0.243) (0.295) (0.416)
Number of children under 5 years old 0.088* 0.114** 0.048 0.147*** 0.150*** 0.137
(0.061) (0.042) (0.415) (0.004) (0.002) (0.104)
Woman has a National Identity Card (NIC or CNIC) (1=Yes 0.027 0.021 0.033 0.042 0.043 0.035
(0.292) (0.505) (0.180) (0.228) (0.216) (0.274)
Woman voted in last local elections (1=Yes)  1 0.022 0.002 0.042* 0.036 0.037 0.034
(0.333) (0.942) (0.095) (0.232) (0.223) (0.307)
Access to radio (1=Yes) 0.011 0.032 -0.014 -0.014 -0.008 -0.045
(0.728) (0.362) (0.722) (0.757) (0.854) (0.324)
Access to TV (1=Yes) 0.022 0.041 0.000 0.026 0.028 0.028
(0.522) (0.247) (0.997) (0.630) (0.598) (0.598)
Access to cable (1=yes) -0.059 -0.064 -0.045 -0.118* -0.116* -0.116**
(0.175) (0.204) (0.365) (0.079) (0.080) (0.028)
Mobility Index (0 to 3) 0.032 0.055 0.005 0.012 0.020 -0.034
(0.456) (0.214) (0.920) (0.826) (0.710) (0.665)
Woman allowed to join an NGO (1=Yes) -0.003 0.008 -0.020 -0.022 -0.019 -0.033
(0.915) (0.762) (0.534) (0.506) (0.573) (0.363)
Woman is a member of MRDO (1=Yes) 1 -0.004 0.018 -0.029 0.030 0.023 0.072
(0.870) (0.531) (0.371) (0.410) (0.508) (0.105)
Woman seeks advice from a religious leader or "Pir" (1=Y -0.051 -0.031 -0.079* -0.057 -0.062 -0.043
(0.129) (0.424) (0.066) (0.246) (0.214) (0.414)
N. Observations 2,637 1,827 1,577 2,637 2,303 768
P-value F test of joint significance 0.294 0.057 0.440 0.401 0.305 0.001
Table 2: Differences by treatment status
Notes: T refers to the sample of treated households, C control households, CTN control households in treated clusters, TN households in treated clusters (including both 
treated and control households) and CN households in control clusters (all are control households). 
1 indicates that the variable is created using only the sample from the 
pre-election visit. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
Treatment 
vs control 
households
Treated 
clusters vs 
control 
clusters
Treated 
household
s only vs 
control 
clusters
Control 
households 
in treated 
clusters vs 
households 
in control 
clusters
T-C TN-CN T-CN CTN-CN
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Treatment
Treatment  (T) 0.06 0.118 0.120* 0.121*
(0.045) (0.073) (0.071) (0.062)
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21
Panel B: T1 vs T2
Importance of voting (T1) 0.034 0.095 0.094 0.109
(0.052) (0.077) (0.075) (0.070)
Importance of voting and secret balloting (T2) 0.093* 0.145* 0.152** 0.135*
(0.048) (0.077) (0.074) (0.079)
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.21
N. Observations 2,637 2,637 2,304 767
Mean dependent variable among CN 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
P-value (T1 = T2) 0.223 0.308 0.229 0.752
P-value  (F-test for joint significance of T1 and T2) 0.146 0.159 0.106 0.152
Table 3:  Effect on Female Turnout
Note: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a woman reports having voted in the February 2008 
elections and had a verifiable ink mark on her thumb. The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. All specifications include village fixed effects and the following 
controls: number of registered female voters, whether woman has a NIC or CNIC, level of schooling, 
age, zaat status, TV access, number of children between 0-5, total land owned, index of mobility and 
whether woman seeks advise from "Pir". Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficient and are clustered at the geographic cluster level. 
75m 100m 200m
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Treatment
Treatment (T) 0.122* 0.153** 0.119*
(0.065) (0.074) (0.070)
Control with T within radius (CT) 0.105* 0.133* 0.072
(0.060) (0.071) (0.064)
Number of households within radius 0.006 0.006* 0.004**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.23
P-Value  (T=CT) 0.612 0.549 0.192
Panel B: T1 vs T2
Importance of voting (T1) 0.092 0.132* 0.12
(0.066) (0.070) (0.078)
Importance of voting and secret balloting (T2) 0.146** 0.182** 0.167**
(0.063) (0.069) (0.075)
Control with T1 within radius (CT1) 0.045 0.066 -0.004
(0.054) (0.058) (0.060)
Control with T2 within radius  (CT2) 0.114* 0.149** 0.151*
(0.064) (0.071) (0.086)
Number of households within radius 0.005 0.005* 0.003*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
R-squared 0.191 0.20 0.20
P-value (T1 = CT1) 0.461 0.350 0.148
P-value (T2 = CT2) 0.418 0.472 0.764
P-value (T1 = T2) 0.245 0.285 0.322
P-value (CT1 = CT2) 0.425 0.392 0.211
N. Observations 2,637 2,637 2,637
Mean dependent variable among CN 0.58 0.58 0.58
Table 4:  Spillover Effects using distance - I
Note: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a woman reports having voted in the February 2008 
elections and had a verifiable ink mark on her thumb. The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 % respectively. All specifications include village fixed effects and the following controls: 
number of registered female voters, whether woman has a NIC or CNIC, level of schooling, age, zaat 
status, TV access, number of children between 0-5, total land owned, index of mobility and whether 
woman seeks advise from "Pir". Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and 
are clustered at the geographic cluster level.
Table 5:  Spillover Effects using distance - II
Mean Median Coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment (T) 0.037
[0.031]
Number of treated  women within 0-200 radius 40.40 35.00 0.007***
[0.001]
Number of treated  women within 200-400 radius 20.47 16.00 0.009***
[0.002]
Number of treated  women within 400-600 radius 11.91 4.00 0.007***
[0.002]
Number of treated  women within 600-800 radius 15.50 6.00 0.005**
[0.002]
Number of treated  women within 800-1000 radius 11.08 1.00 0.005*
[0.003]
Number of treated  women within 1000-1,200 radius 7.88 0.00 0.002
[0.003]
Number of women within 0-200 radius 56.78 47.00 -0.002**
[0.001]
Number of women within 200-400 radius 29.84 24.00 -0.004***
[0.001]
Number of women within 400-600 radius 18.33 7.00 -0.005***
[0.001]
Number of women within 600-800 radius 21.28 8.00 -0.003*
[0.002]
Number of women within 800-1000 radius 15.81 4.00 -0.004*
[0.002]
Number of women within 1000-1,200 radius 11.50 0.00 0.000
[0.002]
Observations 2,637
R-squared 0.234
Note: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a woman reports having voted in the February 
2008 elections and had a verifiable ink mark on her thumb. In column 1, the mean of each variable is 
reported. Column 2 reports the coefficient along with the standard errors in parentheses below the 
coefficient, clustered at the gepgraphic cluster level.  The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 % respectively. All specifications include village fixed effects and the following 
controls: number of registered female voters, whether woman has a NIC or CNIC, level of schooling, 
age, zaat status, TV access, number of children between 0-5, total land owned, index of mobility and 
whether woman seeks advise from "Pir". 
Table 6: Spillovers at the Polling Station Level 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Turnout
Share of Treated Women 0.864*** 0.991*** -0.044 -0.149
[0.259] [0.240] [0.187] [0.183]
R-squared 0.370 0.601 0.003 0.247
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.584 0.584 0.487 0.487
Panel B: Share of PPPP
Share of Treated Women -0.614** -0.611* -0.335 -0.372
(0.277) (0.314) (0.326) (0.290)
R-squared 0.205 0.237 0.127 0.080
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.621 0.623 0.630 0.630
Polling Station Controls No Yes No Yes
N. Observations 21 21 21 21
Women Men
Note: The dependent variable in Panel A is the share of  valid votes cast by women 
(columns 1-2) and men (columns 3-4) over the total number of registered women/men. In 
Panel B, the dependent variable is the share of votes obtained by PPPP over the total 
number of valid votes. 'Share of treated women' is  calculated by dividing the total number 
of women treated, in a polling station, by the number of registered women in the polling 
station. The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Treatment vs 
control 
households
Treated 
clusters vs 
control 
clusters
Treated 
households 
only vs 
control 
clusters
Control 
households 
in treated 
clusters vs 
households 
in control 
clusters
T-C TN-CN T-CN CTN-CN
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Treatment
Treatment  (T) -0.056 -0.157*** -0.146*** -0.218***
[0.041] [0.052] [0.047] [0.077]
R-squared 0.166 0.175 0.196 0.285
Panel B: T1 vs T2
Importance of voting (T1) -0.023 -0.130* -0.114* -0.202**
[0.052] [0.069] [0.065] [0.091]
Importance of voting and secret balloting (T2) -0.093 -0.190*** -0.183*** -0.246***
[0.057] [0.057] [0.055] [0.090]
R-squared 0.171 0.179 0.201 0.286
N. Observations 1,133 1,133 974 299
Mean dependent variable among CN 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950
P-value (T1 = T2) 0.328 0.403 0.346 0.652
P-value  (F-test for joint significance of T1 and T2) 0.264 0.005 0.004 0.017
Table 7:  Effect on Female PPPP Vote
Note: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a woman reports having voted for PPPP in the February 
2008 elections and was verified as having voted. The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent respectively. All specifications include village fixed effects and the following controls: number 
of registered female voters, whether woman has a NIC or CNIC, level of schooling, age, zaat status, TV access, 
number of children between 0-5, total land owned, index of mobility and whether woman seeks advise from 
"Pir". Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and are clustered at the geographic 
cluster level. 
Treated 
clusters vs 
control 
clusters
Treated 
households 
only vs 
control 
clusters
Control 
households 
in treated 
clusters vs  
control 
clusters
TN-CN T-CN CTN-CN
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Treatment
Treatment (T) -0.007 -0.015 0.024
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Man reporting about woman -0.012 -0.010 -0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Man reporting x T -0.085*** -0.082*** -0.104*
(0.027) (0.028) (0.054)
R-Squared 0.065 0.069 0.125
Panel B: T1 vs T2
Importance of voting (T1) -0.016 -0.026 0.012
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025)
Importance of voting and secret balloting (T2) 0.002 -0.003 0.024
(0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Man reporting about woman -0.012 -0.010 -0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Man reporting x T1 -0.064* -0.072* -0.025
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040)
Man reporting x T2 -0.107*** -0.093** -0.189**
(0.032) (0.035) (0.084)
R-squared 0.064 0.070 0.126
N. Observations 3,713 3,200 914
Mean dependent variable among CN 0.983 0.983 0.983
P-value  (T1=T2) 0.475 0.431 0.688
P-value  (Male Report x T1=Male Report x T2) 0.313 0.659 0.067
Table 8: Effect on Candidate Choice Using Cross Reports from Family Members
Note: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a woman's self-report  about candidate choice 
matches the report of the reportee, either another woman in the household or the male head. 
Each observation is therefore a pair with several observations for each woman. If a reporter 
believes that a woman did not vote or does not know whom she voted for, the dependent variable 
is coded as missing. All specifications include village fixed effects and the following controls: 
number of registered female voters, whether reportee has a NIC or CNIC, level of schooling, age, 
zaat status, TV access, number of children between 0-5, total land owned, index of mobility and 
whether woman seeks advise from a "Pir". Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficient and are clustered at the geographic cluster level. The symbols *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % respectively.
N. Obs
Index of 
knowledge 
of current 
events
Index of 
opinion on 
democracy
Woman 
checked 
voter list 
after 
intervention
Woman 
believes 
elections 
were free and 
fair
Woman 
witnessed or 
heard about 
violence in 
village
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2637 0.005 0.066 0.051* 0.070** -0.104**
(0.072) [0.041] (0.030) (0.034) (0.044)
2304 0.012 0.069 0.053* 0.075** -0.101**
(0.070) [0.042] (0.031) (0.033) (0.042)
767 -0.025 0.046 0.048 0.060 -0.122**
(0.094) [0.052] (0.035) (0.037) (0.049)
Mean dependent variable among CN 0.00 -0.03 0.61 0.88 0.27
Treated households only vs control clusters (T-CN)
Treated clusters vs control clusters (TN-CN)
Control households in treated clusters vs 
households in control clusters (CTN-CN)
Note: The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % respectively. All specifications include village fixed 
effects and the following controls: number of registered female voters, whether woman has a NIC or CNIC, level of schooling, 
age, zaat status, TV access, number of children between 0-5, total land owned, index of mobility and whether woman seeks 
advise from "Pir". Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and are clustered at the geographic cluster 
level. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A1.
Table 9: Effect on Knowledge and Perceptions
Definition
Polling Station Characteristics
Share Valid Votes Share of valid votes cast by women (columns 1-2) and men (3-4)
Share PPP  Share of votes obtained by PPPP over the total number of valid votes
Share of treated women calculated by dividing the total number of women treated, in a polling station, by the number of registered women in the polling station.
St. Dev of asset index Standard Deviation of household asset Index
St. Dev of distance to polling station Standard deviation of distance to polling station 
Pct. of Women with Access to Cable TV Percentage of Women with Access to Cable TV
Household Characteristics
Household size Total number of individuals in the household including children
Asset Index
The first component of a PCAincluding the number of refrigerators, freezers, fans, geysers, washing machines/dryers, cooking stoves, TVs, VCRs, VCPs/ CD
players, Radios/ cassette players, sewing/knitting machines, dish antennas, cable services, bicycles, motorcycles, cows, buffalos and goats, as well as a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if household owned any major agricultural assets/ machinery.
Total owned land (in acres) Total acres of owned land by the household
Average monthly expenditure (in 
thousands)
Average monthly expenditure computed using the mid point of the following options: less than 2,000, greater than 2,000 but less than 4,000, greater than
4,000 but less than 6,000, greater than 6,000 but less than 8,000, greater than 8,000 but less than 10,000, greater than 10,000 but less than 15,000, greater
than 15,000 but less than 25,000, greater than 25,000 but less than 35,000.
House quality index
Index constructed using principal components analysis using number of rooms and dummy variables that take value 1 if house has pacca walls, a roof made
of concrete, iron/brick/tile or wood/brick/tile, the toilet is flush connected to public sewerage, flush connected to pit or flush connected to open drain latrine
and the main source of drinking water for the household is either piped water or hand pump.
Distance to polling station (Km.) Total distance in Km. from household to polling station.
Low Zaat (Caste) Status Household belongs to service or menial zaat groups
Woman Characteristics
Woman has formal schooling (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman has any formal schooling.
Woman is married (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman is married.
Number of children under age 5 Number of children under 5 years old over total number of children that the woman has.
Woman would be allowed to join a NGO 
(1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman would be allowed to get involved in an NGO if one were to start working in their village.
Has a NIC (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a national identity card
Access to radio (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman has access to a radio.
Access to TV (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman has access to TV.
Access to cable (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman has access to cable.
Hours of Radio in an average week The product of number of hours of radio listened in an average day times number of days respondent listens to the radio in an average week.
Gets World new from BBC's Urdu Service  Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent reported turning to BBC radio first for getting world news
Number of hrs of TV watched in avg week The product of number of hours of TV watched in an average day times number of days respondent watches TV in an average week
Mobility Index
Index based on questions about whether woman would be allowed to go to bazaars , doctors or for social visits outside her village and her settlement. 1= No
to all three; 2=accompanied by adult male and 3= Accompanied by adult female, children or alone. The index is the sum of responses divided by 3
MRDO membership (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman is a member of a community organization in her village.
Index of community action taken
Index constructed using prinicipal components analysis of 3 questions on methods tried to resolve different situations for both men and women(election
officials left name off voter list, police wrongly arrested someone in family, someone wrongly seized family's land). The 3 questions were recoded to 1 if
                           
Index of contact with formal authority
Index constructed by adding 1 (0 otherwise) if the answers is YES to following questions whether during the past year he/she contacted a local government
councilor (Nazim, Naib Nazim) and contacted a political party official. The total is divided by 2.
Index of contact with informal authority
Index constructed by adding 1 (0 otherwise) if the answers is YES to following questions whether during the past year he/she contacted a religious leader
(Pir, Murshid) and contacted a traditional ruler (Wadera, Maalik, Numberdar). The total is divided by 2.
Table A1. Definition of Variables 
Variable 
Definition
Knowledge of current events and the political process
Aware of imposition of Emergency Rule 
(1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent had heard about the imposition of the emergency rule, the removal of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the
house arrest of various lawyers.
Index of knowledge of current events
Average score of the following knowledge questions: "Aware of imposition of emergency/house arrest of lawyers and removal of Chief Justice" and  "Knows 
name of newly elected Prime Minister". 
Share of political party signs correctly 
identified
Proportion of signs (outof 7) that respondent were able to correctly match to a political party contesting for a National Assembly seat.
Share of political party names correctly 
identified
Proportion of party's names contesting for National Assembly that the respondent was able to recall perfectly out of 2.
Recalls winning candidate (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman perfectly recalled the name of the candidate that won the National Assembly seat in her constituency
Recalls names of main candidates (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman perfectly recalled the names of the candidates from the two main parties that contested a National Assembly seat
Knows the gender of main candidates 
(1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman perfectly identified the gender of the candidates from the two main parties that contested a National Assembly seat
Voting behavior and perceptions
Checked voter list after February 5th 
(1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if after February 5th woman or a family member checked to see if she was on the voter list.
Voted in last elections (local) (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman voted in the last local body elections.
Voted in Feb 08 (1=Yes) Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent voted in this national elections.
Witnessed or heard of any type of 
violence in/near village (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman personally witnessed or heard of any type of violence in/near her village.
Elections were free and fair (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman believes that the national elections held in February 18th 2008 were "Completely free and fair" or "Free and fair, but
with minor problems" instead of "Free and fair but with minor problems" and "Not free and fair".
Index of opinion on democracy
Disagreement with the following statement: "Only educated should vote" and average disapproval of the following forms of government: "Only one party is 
allowed to stand for election and hold office. ", "The army comes in to govern the country", "There are no elections, no MPA or MNA and the president 
 Recall of Intervention
Visit before elections (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that she was visited before the elections to tell her about the importance of the
elections and voting.
Present in visit before elections (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that she was present in the visit before the elections to tell her about the importance
of the elections and voting.
Attend presentation in a neighbor's 
house (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that she was present in the visit that took place in a neighbor's house before the
elections to tell them about the importance of the elections and voting.
Neighbors joined during visit (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that some neighbors were present in the visit that took place at her house before the
elections to tell them about the importance of the elections and voting.
Issues raised: importance of voting 
(1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that the issue raised during the visit before the elections was about the importance
of voting.
Issues raised: importance of secret voting 
(1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that the issue raised during the visit before the elections was about the importance
of voting secrecy.
Issues raised: importance of voting and 
secrecy (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that the issues raised during the visit before the elections were the importance of
voting and importance of voting secrecy.
Talked about visit (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that she talked about the visit and the issues raised during the visit with others in her
neighborhood.
Neighbor talked about meeting to 
woman (1=Yes)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman confirmed in the follow-up survey that some women from her neighborhood talk to her about the meeting which she
had attended in the days preceding the election.
Table A1. Definition of Variables (cont.)
Variable 
Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Access to Media
Access to Radio (1=Yes) 1,923 0.47 0.42 0.061
Number of hours of radio listened to in an average week 852 9.7 9.63 0.867
Access to TV (1=Yes) 1,923 0.67 0.629 0.103
Number of hours of TV watched in an average week 1,222 15.3 11.0 0.000
Access to cable TV (1=Yes) 1,923 0.29 0.23 0.008
Listens to BBC's urdu service for world news (1=Yes) 852 0.10 0.48 0.000
Panel B: Knowledge of Political Parties and Elections
Share of political party signs correctly identified 1,923 0.28 0.42 0.000
Share of political party names correctly identified 1,923 0.86 0.96 0.000
Knows the gender of main candidates (1=Yes) 1,923 0.95 0.98 0.483
Recalls names of main candidates (1=Yes) 1,923 0.82 0.86 0.488
Recalls winning candidate (1=Yes) 1,923 0.90 0.95 0.219
Aware of Emergency Rule (1=Yes) 1,923 0.10 0.51 0.000
Panel C: Participation in Public Life
Attends community meetings (1=Yes) 1,923 0.18 0.52 0.000
Attends demonstrations (1=Yes) 1,923 0.12 0.23 0.000
Attended political rally before intervention (1=Yes) 1,923 0.05 0.24 0.000
Takes action
If name missing in voter list (1=Yes) 1,923 0.76 0.92 0.000
If police mistakenly arrest family member (1=Yes) 1,923 0.93 0.98 0.000
If family land is seized (1=Yes) 1,923 0.92 0.98 0.000
Index of community action taken 1,923 -0.29 0.69 0.000
Contacts local councilor (1=Yes) 1,923 0.25 0.37 0.000
Contacts a local political party official (1=Yes) 1,923 0.22 0.38 0.000,
Index of formal authority contact 1,923 -0.10 0.34 0.000
Contacts a religious leader (1=Yes) 1,923 0.66 0.49 0.000
Contacts a traditional ruler (1=Yes) 1,923 0.45 0.32 0.000
Index of informal authority contact 1,921 0.12 -0.30 0.000
Note: Data come from follow-up survey. Male refers to head of household while female to their 
spouse. P-values were calculated from a regressions of each variable on a gender dummy. The 
regression included village fixed effects and standard errors were clustered at the geographical cluster 
level. 
Means
Table A2. Gender Differences
P-value 
of t-test 
of (2)-(3)
N. Obs
Panel A: Treatment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (T) -0.004 -0.003 0.01 0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Baseline Contols? N Y N Y
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Panel B: T1 vs T2
Importance of voting (T1) -0.022 -0.022 -0.004 -0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Importance of voting and secret balloting (T2) 0.020 0.021 0.029* 0.030**
(0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015)
Baseline Contols? N Y N Y
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
Mean dependent variable 0.035 0.035 0.026 0.026
Observations 2,734       2,734       1,019       1,019       
Table A3. Attrition
Note: Regressions (1) and (2) are at the women level and (3) to (4) are at the household level. 
In the latter the controls take the average value of the women within a household. The 
dependant variable takes the value 1 if woman attrited. All regressions include village fixed 
effects and  the following control variables collected during pre-election visit are included 
when noted: Woman has NIC or CNIC, voted in last elections, woman is a member of MRDO 
and the number of females in the household. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
below the coefficients and are clustered at the geographical cluster level. The symbols *, **, 
*** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % respectively.
Women Level Household Level
N. Obs All T T1 T2 C in T
C in 
T1 
C in 
T2 
C in 
control 
clusters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Information about visit
Received visit before elections (1=Yes) 2,637 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Neighbors joined during visit (1=Yes) 1,867 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.15 -- -- -- --
Issues raised during visit
Importance of voting 1,867 0.64 0.64 0.98 0.19 -- -- -- --
Importance of voting in accordance to own preferences 1,867 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.12 -- -- -- --
Both 1,867 0.30 0.30 0.01 0.69 -- -- -- --
Discussed visit with neighbors (1=Yes) 1,867 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.50 -- -- -- --
Panel B: Information about political discussions
Discuss political issues with women in neighborhood (1=Yes) 2,637 0.44 0.55 0.50 0.62 0.40 0.30 0.51 0.18
Issues raised during conversations
Party/Candidate Positions 847 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.59
Importance of voting 847 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.83 0.88
Importance of voting in accordance to own preferences 847 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.51
Table A4. Information about intervention and about political discussions
Notes: Data come from follow-up survey. Column (1) refers to the number of observations for column (2). Columns (3) -(5) report 
data for treated women. Columns (6)-(8) report data for control women in treated clusters. Column (9) reports data for control 
women in control clusters.
T CN
P-
value 
of t-
test (1)-
(2) T CN
P-value 
of t-test 
(4)-(5) T CN
P-value 
of t-test 
(7)-(8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Percentage of women who
Voted for the same party as male head 44.6 41.7 0.500 13.5 11.6 0.326 57.25 56.94 0.950
Voted for different party from head 10.1 2.8 0.010 2.2 1.4 0.647 13.15 3.47 0.000
Voted but male head did not 6.1 3.7 0.220 1.7 2.7 0.274 7.89 4.17 0.090
Did not vote 38.6 50.9 0.010 82.0 84.2 0.526 21.04 34.03 0.010
N. Observations 1,870 434 539 146 1,331    288
Table A5: Impact on Women's Participation and Candidate Choice
Note: P-values are from regressions with village fixed effects, woman characteristics as controls and robust standard errors 
clustered at the geographic cluster level. The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % respectively. 
All Women Not voted in the past Voted in the past
